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Abstract 
This paper analyses the determinants of spatial wage disparities in the US context for the 
period 1980-2000. Agglomeration benefits are estimated based on city productivity premia 
which are computed after controlling for the skills distribution among metropolitan areas as 
well as industry fixed effects. The drivers of productivity differentials that are taken into 
consideration are the size of the local economy, the spatial interactions among local 
autonomous economic systems and the structure of urban governance as well as the policy 
responses to the fragmentation issue. A metropolitan area with ten percentage more 
administrative units than another of the same size, experiences wages that are between 2.0% 
and 3.0% lower. The presence of a voluntary governance body is found to mitigate the 
problem of fragmentation only marginally, while the existence of special purpose districts have 
a negative impact on regional productivity. The implementation of a metropolitan government 
with a regional tax system is expected to increase productivity by around 6%.  
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1 Introduction
In the US, the huge variability of nominal wages across metropolitan statistical
areas (MSA) is a well known fact. Wage disparities are extensively documented
in Moretti (2011) who argues that the difference between the 10th and the 90th
percentile of the wage distribution for average high school graduates account for
approximately 32%. The literature has identified a number of explanations by re-
ferring to agglomeration economies (Marshall, 1890; Duranton and Puga, 2004),
locational fundamentals such as amenities (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999) and work-
force skill composition (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Despite being often assumed
as an important driver of local economic performance (Storper, 2010), the role of
institutions in enhancing agglomeration benefits has tended to be overlooked by the
literature. In fact, metropolitan statistical areas greatly differ both in terms of popu-
lation distribution between the city centre and the outlying territories as well as for
the numerousness of administrative subregions. For example, the MSA of Atlanta is
a distinctive case example of metropolitan fragmentation with twenty counties and
a mass transit system that does not extend far enough into the suburbs where work-
ers live. In California, Sacramento and San Jose do not have many administrative
jurisdictions but in the former metropolitan area population is twice as concentrated
in the city centre.
The paucity of empirical studies is in contrast with anecdotal evidences and qual-
itative enquires suggesting formal structure of metropolitan governance as a channel
of direct intervention for spurring local productivity (Anas, 1999; Duckett, 2012).
For example, difficult coordination among local governments due to a mismatch
between the boundaries of the local economic system and the administratively de-
fined ones may obstruct infrastructure investments and effective land use planning
(Ahrend et al., 2014b); moreover, a multiplicity of laws and regulations increase
transaction costs for businesses that operate in multiple jurisdictions (Wolman et al.,
2011). Finally, localized increasing returns may accrue from sharing facilities Puga
(2010) that are more likely to be created at metropolitan scale by a club of juris-
dictions. The smaller the number of participating agencies, the lower the costs of
formation and maintenance of the club unless there is a dominant one that can as-
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sume a leading role (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998).
Some attempts have been made in order to mitigate the problems derived from
poor metropolitan governance. In the US, these issues are addressed through two
mechanisms: special purpose governments and voluntary agreements, but both so-
lutions may have limited effectiveness. The former tend to complicate the problem
by adding an other layer to the existing multiplicity of local governments (Duckett,
2012; Orfield and Gumus-Dawes, 2009); the latter may not be geographically ad-
herent to the metropolitan area and tend to under-represent central cities in voting
boards, while favouring outlying counties. Portland, OR and Minneapolis - Saint
Paul, MN are two exceptions to the predominant type of metropolitan governance
in the US. In fact, the former has a governance body that has the status of full local
government and a leadership elected by popular vote. The latter, delivers a wide
range of services and have implemented a metropolitan tax-based sharing that is
welcomed by some authors (see for example Orfield, 2002; Wolman et al., 2011).
Our primary objective is to quantitatively assess the impact of different dimen-
sions of the structure of urban governance on local productivity premia. We con-
centrate on the distribution of population in metropolitan areas, whether more or
less concentrated in the central city, as well as on the number of administrative
defined jurisdictions that divide the territory of functional economic regions. Poor
governance of metropolitan areas may mitigate the extent to which agglomeration
enhances productivity. The analysis of the policy responses to this problem is the
second objective of the paper. Governance bodies are created in order to solve co-
ordination difficulties among local governments, but their effectiveness remains an
open issue.
Empirical evidences on the role of metropolitan governance structure is rather
scant. Most of the studies focus on its relationship with the rate of local economic
growth (as Nelson and Foster, 1999; Paytas, 2001; Stansel, 2005; Hammond and To-
sun, 2011), which is usually analysed in cross sectional growth models adopting the
convergence approach pioneered by Barro (1991) and criticized as uninformative
and perhaps misleading for both theoretical and empirical reasons (Cheshire and
Malecki, 2004; Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, Ahrend
et al. (2014a) is the only study that analyses the impact of fragmented governments
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on productivity premia in five OECD countries. Our paper follows the latter but we
provide a number of original contributions to the literature. First of all, we different
dimensions of metropolitan governance structure enter the analysis: the number of
local governments and the degree of dominance of the central city are considered
as complements rather than substitutes. Other indices introduced in the literature
(Grassmueck and Shields, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2004) are excluded because of
both high correlation with dominance and fragmentation measures and endogene-
ity problems due to their computation based on local governments expenditures.
Secondly, we introduce a time variability in these dimensions by letting the bound-
aries of the spatial units of analysis to change over time. In this way results about
the difficulties deriving from poor governance of metropolitan areas are derived ro-
bustly also to the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Briant et al., 2010) and remain
even after accounting for a state centralization component. Thirdly, we provide an
evaluation of the policy responses by distinguishing between special districts, volun-
tary agreements that are further divided into Council of Governments (COGs) and
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), the variety of services provided by Re-
gional Councils as well as the geographic adherence of COGs to metropolitan area.
Moreover, we test the hypothesis about the beneficial impact of general purpose
governments, such as the one implemented in the Twin Cities, at the metropolitan
level.
From amethodological point of view, we follow the approach suggested by Combes
and Gobillon (2015) consisting in a two-stages procedure where productivity pre-
mia are estimated in the first stage by using micro data and then used as depen-
dent variable. Hypothesis about the structure of urban governance and the policy
responses to the fragmentation problem are tested in the second stage where a spec-
ification including a spatial lag of the independent variable is adopted in order to
take into account spatial dependence between metropolitan areas. Moreover, we
propose a floating approach for the identification of metropolitan areas that takes
into consideration their territorial evolution over time. By letting the spatial units
of analysis free to modify the boundaries in accordance to the correspondent local
autonomous economic system, it is possible to avoid biases related to the structure
of urban governance. Secondly, the analysis considers the reverse causation problem
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deriving from the fact that not only city productivity is affected by the density of the
metropolitan area, but also the viceversa holds. In order to tackle the endogenous
quantity of labour, an instrumental approach is suggested and the counter-factual
for the local evolution of the population is computed from the average of national
employment changes in the industrial sectors, weighted by the initial shares of local
sectoral structure. Finally, the study considers the possibility that the rate of decline
of agglomeration benefits is sharper than the one determined by the inverse of the
distance. In order to test the hypothesis, the distance decay parameter is estimated
by using a nonlinear estimation technique based on Vega and Elhorst (2015).
The analysis in this article focuses on US metropolitan areas and the period of
analysis runs from 1980 to 2000. We employed microdata (IPUMS, Ruggles et al.
(2015)) as well as macrodata series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We as-
sess the impact of the structure of urban governance and we find that both the level
of fragmentation and the degree of dominance of the central city have an effect on
the rise of agglomeration externalities that is significant. In particular, a metropoli-
tan area with ten percentage more administrative units than another of the same
size, experiences wages that are between 2.0% and 3.0% lower. Moreover, a ten
percentage point decrease in the share of population living in the central city is es-
timated to reduce productivity by a small on average but highly significant amount,
that is between 0.7% and 0.8%. By nonlinearly estimating the distance decay pa-
rameter, rather than imposing it beforehand, it turns out that the rate of decline
of agglomeration benefits is sharper than the one determined by the inverse of the
distance. Finally, the presence of a voluntary governance body or a high number
of special districts determine a lower level of productivity, meaning that they do not
solve the coordination problems at the regional level. The result remains as it is even
after looking in details at the services provided by the Regional Councils. Instead,
the presence of a general purpose metropolitan government is expected to increase
local productivity by about 6%.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the issues
at stake about wage disparities, metropolitan governance structure and policy re-
sponses to the fragmentation problem, Section 3 explains the methodology adopted,
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and the results, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Spatial Disparities and Urban Governance Structure
2.1 Productivity differences across US MSAs
The issue of spatial disparities in wages and productivity levels is a source of
considerable policy concern. In many countries, individual wages exhibit strong
and persistent differences not only between rural and urban regions, but also across
metropolitan areas. The US territory is no exception: the average high school grad-
uate living in the median metropolitan area earns $14.1 for each hour worked; the
10th and 90th percentile of the wages distribution for average high school graduates
across metropolitan areas are $12.5 and $16.5, respectively (Moretti, 2011), which
accounts for a 32% difference. On average, a full-time worker between the age of
25 and 60 may experience an increase in the earned nominal wage of about 40% by
moving from Abilene, TX to San Jose, CA. The figure applies to high school graduates
and it is not the most extreme case: if this worker had a college degree, the increase
in nominal wage rise to about 50%. Clearly, land prices vary as well across locations;
therefore, variations in real wages are significantly smaller than in nominal terms.
Still, differences in nominal wages are not without meaning as they say something
about local productivity premia (Combes and Gobillon, 2015; Gibbons et al., 2014).
The idea is that a firm set in San Jose, CA would had preferred paying lower wages
and land rents by relocating in Abilene, TX if it had had no significant productive
advantages in the West Coast. Hence, even though labour markets are not perfectly
competitive and labour is barely paid at the value of its marginal product, higher
wages can be seen as evidence of higher productivity.
Urban productivity premia are strictly related to the size of the cities: it is well
known that large cities produce more output per capita than small cities do. The
literature has identified one of the causal factors in the economies that accrue from
agglomeration, as introduced by Marshall (1890). A high density of firms and work-
ers generates increasing returns to scale at the local level because of the emergence of
a number of positive externalities. For example, Duranton and Puga (2004) cited the
matching between employers and employee, the learning spillovers and the sharing
of infrastructures as well as of facilities. On the latter, Burchfield et al. (2006) found
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that cities with shared public facilities for the provision of water are more populous
than those in which cities aquifers make individual household wells viable. While
part of the literature has tried to disentangle the magnitude of the mechanisms at
play (Puga, 2010), some scholars proposed other factors explaining urban productiv-
ity premia. For instance, a locus ameneusmay have locational fundamentals that are
able to attract people and economic activity per se. On the other hand, high-skilled
individuals usually prefer to live in denser cities (Bacolod et al., 2009; Glaeser and
Resseger, 2010) causing output per worker to increase because of workers sorting.
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2015) propose a unique theoretical framework sup-
ported by the empirical literature that shows a reduction in agglomeration benefits
once productivity endogeneity is taken into account (Melo et al., 2009). Finally,
spatial relationships among metropolitan areas matter as well. The literature on ag-
glomeration economies agrees in arguing that wage differences across metropolitan
areas may also be determined by proximity to markets for intermediate and final
goods (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). In this regard, urban economists usually adopt
the concept of market potential: cities should be larger and pay higher wages if
they have better access to markets, i.e. if their location has higher market potential
(Harris, 1954). The idea has been introduced in the theoretical literature by New
Economic Geography scholars (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 2001; Redding and
Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005), according to whom city incomes, distance between
cities and the city price indices for manufactured goods are the main ingredients of
market potential. Some of these models cast doubt on the unambiguous positive
effect of a high market potential; Ioannides and Overman (2004) find that spatial
interactions contribute to create city’s ability to generate high wages only from the
end of the Twentieth century.
2.2 Metropolitan governance structure and wage premia
2.2.1 Descriptive evidences
In the present paper, we want to direct the attention towards other factors that we
think are able to explain some part of the variability in productivity across metropoli-
tan areas. Our focus is the structure of metropolitan governance, which represents
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the spatial organisation of formal institutions of local government as well as informal
networks in a core-based city region. To clarify the issue, a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) may be conceived as a statistical unit of analysis composed by one or
more administratively defined jurisdictions on which population is not uniformly dis-
tributed. Usually, metropolitan areas include one central municipality surrounded
by a number of outlying jurisdictions that are linked to the former through commut-
ing patterns of people living in the suburbs but working in the city centre as well as
by input-output relations among local firms. We define the level of urban fragmenta-
tion as the number of administratively defined jurisdictions (local governments) that
insists on a metropolitan area and the degree of dominance of the central jurisdiction
as the share of population living in the major municipality. We make an argument to
support the thesis that the dispersion of political power, both in terms of numerous-
ness of administratively defined jurisdictions and as distribution of population in a
local autonomous economic system, limits the extent to which agglomeration bene-
fits foster local economic productivity. We support the need for a policy response to
the issue of poor metropolitan governance but we raise concerns about the effective-
ness of existing solutions. Our belief is that only a governance body that resembles
a full-fledged regional system can have the capabilities to mitigate the problem.
We collect (and report in Table A3 of the Appendix) a number of descriptive
evidences to corroborate our conjectures and to give a flavour of the real dimen-
sions of the question. Let’s start by comparing the economic performance in terms
of wage premia1 of two metropolitan areas with a similar level of population such
as San Francisco, CA and Atlanta, GA. Wage premium in the former is about 25%
higher than in the latter where we observe both a higher number of municipalities
(Fragmentation) and a more dispersed population (Dominance). We notice the same
pattern when we look at the figures for New York, NY and Los Angeles, CA with a
discrepancy in wage premia favouring the East Cost city. In this case, much of the
variation in the structure of urban governance comes from differences in the con-
centration of population as in Los Angeles, CA, it is 2.2 times more dispersed than
in New York, NY. On the opposite, the stark difference in the way urban governance
1 Data refer to the year 2000. Reported wage premia correspond to those estimated in the first-
stage of the empirical analysis; therefore, they measure local productivity net of local industrial com-
position and skill effects.
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is structured between St. Louis, MO and Seattle, WA, is in the number of municipal-
ities that insist on the metropolitan area, being more than four times higher in the
former with respect to the other city. At the same time, workers in Seattle benefit
from a wage premium that is almost 37% higher than in St. Louis. The descriptive
evidences suggest the existence of a relationship between structure of urban gover-
nance and wage premia disparities across metropolitan areas, according to which the
more concentrated the political power, the higher the returns to labour. By no means
the two dimensions that we identify can be considered as substitutes: San Jose, CA
and Sacramento, CA, show similar levels of fragmentation but in the more productive
city (San Jose, CA) population is far more concentrated in the city centre. Moreover,
Sacramento, CA does not feature any governance body at the metropolitan level;
a reasonable concern may be whether it is the lack to drive its poor economic per-
formance. The hypothesis seems to be invalidated by the presence of a governance
body in all the other metropolitan areas that we have just mentioned.
2.2.2 The economic debate
The presence of multiple governments of the same type (either townships, mu-
nicipalities or counties) within a metropolitan area may create obstacles to the en-
hancement of metropolitan productivity (Wolman et al., 2011). In the first instance,
local governments are governed by officials who are elected by the voters residing
within the local jurisdiction. Often, elected local officials tend not to take decisions
in a broader, metropolitan perspective, as acting in region’s interest is perceived to
be counter local interests. Secondly, each local government tries to attract local
development within its jurisdictional boundaries in order to receive the revenues
from property tax. Hence, the local tax structure within metropolitan areas encour-
ages inter-jurisdictional competition rather than cooperation to enhance productiv-
ity within the entire area. Finally, businesses that operate in multiple jurisdictions
within a metropolitan area bear higher administrative and regulatory costs imposed
by the multiplicity of laws and regulations.
A bunch of OECD studies (see, for example, Ahrend et al., 2014b; Kim et al.,
2014) argues that municipal fragmentation increases cities’ congestion costs because
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a high number of local governments is more likely to encounter difficulties when it
is necessary to coordinate decisions about transport infrastructure investments or ef-
fective land use planning. As a consequence, businesses and individuals are less en-
couraged to locate in a metropolitan area of this type. Furthermore, Storper (2010)
argues that formal structure of political institutions determines their efficiency in
facilitating economic activity by shaping both the effectiveness of problem-solving
as well as the capacity of adjusting to change and capturing new opportunities. In
particular, initiatives that require areas are difficult to implement in regions with
many small jurisdictions because they can see the light of the day only if a cross-
jurisdictional coalition-building is formed.
Finally, Cheshire and Gordon (1998) investigate more deeply which are the fac-
tors favouring the formation of cross-jurisdictional clubs. In their original view,
agreements between administrative regions belonging to the same local economic
system are desirable in order to implement growth promotion policies, such as the
construction of relevant infrastructures. The reason relies on the presence of inter
jurisdictional spillovers among administrative units of the same metropolitan area:
in the case in which the central jurisdiction of a metropolitan area implements a
project for the realization of a facility, it will benefit also the other regions belonging
to the local economic system. A small number of public agencies belonging to the
club and/or the existence of a dominant jurisdiction with the role of leading agency
are the two elements that increase the probability that a club will actually be cre-
ated and maintained at low costs. The argument on governance they make is about
its impact on the rate of local economic growth but it can be easily sustained also
when talking of local productivity. As a matter of fact, the implementation of growth
promotion policies for the creation of quasi-public goods (such as local public infras-
tructures) is the prerequisite for the activation of the mechanism of sharing facilities
that creates localized increasing returns (Puga, 2010).
Opposite to the previous contributions which support centric government struc-
tures in metropolitan areas, proponents of public choice theory defend poly-centric
or fragmented governance arrangements (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom et al., 1961; Parks
and Oakerson, 1989). In particular, Ostrom (2010) identify three mechanisms that
increase productivity in the presence of multiple governmental units. In the first
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instance, smaller jurisdictions are more effective than larger ones in monitoring the
performance of their citizens and the costs of service provisions; secondly, a mul-
tiplicity of local governments makes it possible for individuals to choose the juris-
diction in which the mix and costs of public services is closer to their preferences;
thirdly, the smaller the administrative units, the better individuals preferences are
likely to be represented and citizens may have more say in the decision process.
In general, advocates of fragmented metropolitan governance argue that the
higher the number of jurisdictions, the lower the transaction costs for households
and firms because of reduced heterogeneity of public policy preferences. The state-
ment draws back to Tiebout (1956) public choice theory, who contends that people,
by “voting with their feet”, decide to live in the communities that better satisfy their
preferences; therefore, the higher the number of jurisdictions among which peo-
ple can choose, the higher the probability that public services are provided more
efficiently because of the high degree of homogeneity of preferences within jurisdic-
tions. On the other hand, centric governance defenders point out how transaction
costs are instead reduced when the metropolitan area is little fragmented because
it is possible to avoid bureaucratic overlap and law inconsistency; moreover, the
region may benefit from economies of scale and scope in providing public goods
and services. In this paper, we support the second argument: the absence of inter-
jurisdictional spillovers which is taken as given in the public choice literature cannot
be assumed in the metropolitan context. Administratively defined regions in a au-
tonomous local economic system are not isolated islands; input-output relationships
among local firms as well as commuting patterns create economic linkages across
space.
Empirical evidence on the role of governance structure is, in general, rather scant.
To our knowledge the only study that analyses the impact of fragmentation on pro-
ductivity is Ahrend et al. (2014a). Studying Functional Urban Areas in five OECD
countries the authors find that cities with more fragmented structures have signif-
icantly lower productivity premia. Other studies instead focus on the relationship
between governance structure and local growth with conflicting results2. Stansel
2 The impact of governance structure has been analysed also within the literature dealing with
urban sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002) and fiscal decentralization (Zhang and Zou, 1998).
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(2005) examines the relationship between local growth and local decentralization in
the US metropolitan context and finds that metropolitan economic performance ap-
pears to be favoured by the presence of a multiplicity of local governments. Similarly,
Hammond and Tosun (2011) find that single-purpose governments per square mile
have a positive impact onmetropolitan population and employment growth, but they
conduct the analysis at the county level and distinguish between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan counties. Grassmueck and Shields (2010) argue that results are
sensitive to the way fragmentation is measured and, resorting to both an Hirshman-
Herfindal-Index and a Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index based on government
expenditures, find that fragmentation is associated with increased employment and
per capita income growth. In contrast, Paytas (2001) and Hamilton et al. (2004)
find evidence in support of the advantages stemming from consolidation by report-
ing that the level of fragmentation and state centralization are negatively related to
metropolitan economic competitiveness. Finally, building on the idea developed by
Cheshire and Gordon (1998) that local growth promotion policies are more likely
to be implemented the higher the degree of dominance of the central administrative
unit within a metropolitan region, Cheshire and Magrini (2009) report a positive
impact of dominance on local growth for major European metropolitan areas.
2.3 Policy responses to poor metropolitan governance
In the US, there have been some policy responses to tackle the lack of coordi-
nation among local governments. In general, metropolitan problems are addressed
through two mechanisms: special purpose governments or voluntary agreements.
The former, special districts, are meant to provide a specific single public service
like, for example, fire, police, water and sewer. Even though the number of lo-
cal governments, such as municipalities and counties, have remained stable over
the decades, the quantity of special purpose governments have increasingly grown.
Duckett (2012) and Orfield and Gumus-Dawes (2009) agree in arguing that special
districts might not be considered as a solution to the issue of poor metropolitan gov-
ernance. As a matter of fact, they tend to complicate the problem by adding an other
layer to the existing multiplicity of local governments; moreover, they usually lack
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accountability. Even worse, being special districts the instrument to provide services
in unincorporated places outside municipal boundaries, they sustain growth occur-
ring in suburban counties, thus fostering further decentralization and fragmentation
(Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002).
The second mechanism to deal with coordination issues at metropolitan scale,
voluntary agreements, have been implemented in a variety of forms which may be
reduced to two broad categories: Council of Governments and Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organizations. Council of Governments (COGs) are associations consisting of
public officials elected in the major local governments of metropolitan areas. Re-
gional Councils, or COGs, may provide a variety of services ranging from public
safety to community development (including both workforce and economic develop-
ment) and covering also environmental and transportation issues. Their purpose is
to establish a consensus about the needs of an area and to provide widely acceptable
solutions. Voluntary governance body may assume the form of Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organization (MPOs), which are federally mandated and funded transportation
policy making organizations made up of representatives from local governments and
governmental transportation authorities. Nationwide, substantial differences among
MPOs remain, even though recent decades have witnessed a devolution of greater re-
sponsibilities for planning and implementations to MPOs. As a matter of fact, states
maintain significant discretion over delegating authorities and continue to play a pri-
mary role in determining most transportation decisions in metropolitan areas (Mc-
Dowell and Edner, 2002). These kind of governance body share a twofold problem
of under-representation. On the one hand, being conceived in the 1960s, they may
not cover completely the current geographic extension of metropolitan areas. On the
other, as Sanchez (2006) points outs, central cities are under-represented on gov-
ernance body voting boards. Governing boards for MPOs and COGs are appointed
by local officials, or they may delegated from local jurisdictions. Usually, each par-
ticipating local government sends a representative to the governance body board
regardless of the size of the jurisdiction represented; therefore, the voting mecha-
nism is often non proportional or not weighted by population. As Lewis and Sprague
(1997) argue, COGs and MPOs have been structured “towards consensus, with more
concern toward representing all local governments on regional boards than on es-
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tablishing equitable criteria for the representation of the region’s population”.
Some authors indicate multi-purpose regional governance structures with strong
powers as the more efficient alternative to deal with the issue of poor metropolitan
governance (Orfield and Gumus-Dawes, 2009;Wolman et al., 2011). Fewmetropoli-
tan areas in the US present these kind of governance bodies that resemble the full-
fledged regional system needed to integrate land use, transportation and housing
at the metropolitan scale. Orfield and Luce (2009) analyse the cases of the Twin
Cities’ Metropolitan Council and Portland’s Metro which are MPOs regional govern-
ing bodies not duplicating functions performed by local governments in the same
metropolitan area. In particular, the Minneapolis - St. Paul region have implemented
a metropolitan tax-base sharing which requires localities to contribute 40% of their
growth in property tax capacity to a regional pool. The collected funds in the pool
are then redistributed to local governments within the metropolitan area and mu-
nicipalities with a lower-than-average tax capacity receive a higher per capita share
(Orfield, 2002).
3 The Methodology
The methodological framework adopted in the paper follows from recent ad-
vancements in the empirics of agglomeration economies (Combes and Gobillon,
2015). Nominal wages are likely to be different across metropolitan areas because
of a variety of reasons. In the first instance, industrial composition of the local econ-
omy demand higher or lower average wages, depending on which industry, if any, is
prevalent in the economic system. Secondly, the average composition of the work-
force plays a role as well: for example, we expect highly educated or more talented
individuals to receive higher wages. Finally, cities may have specific characteristics
that are beneficial to the local economy up to the point of translating into a wage
premium. We hypothesise that the structure of urban governance, together with the
size of the local economy and the agglomeration spillovers among core-based city
regions, play a fundamental role in determining metropolitan areas productivity.
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Combes et al. (2008) present a simple model of agglomeration economies on
which we rely to provide a clear explanation of our methodological strategy. Let’s
consider a representative firm in MSA a, industry k at time t which maximizes profits
⇡a,k,t with a Cobb-Douglas production function ya,k,t expressed in effective labour
and other factors of production. In a competitive equilibrium, first order conditions
for the optimal allocation of inputs lead to a (log-linearised) individual wage which
is a function of a worker effect (Xi,t), an industry effect (ik,t), a core-based city region
effect ( a,t), and a shock specific to worker i at time t:
log wi,t =   Xi,t + ik,t +  a,t + "i,t (1)
The worker effect includes observable individual characteristics, such as age and its
square value, education, gender, ethnicity and occupation of the respondents. Actu-
ally, unobserved characteristics, such as skills and abilities, play a role in determining
nominal wages as well but measurement difficulties prevent them to be included in
a simple repeated cross-section regression, which is in fact our case 3. Hence, in the
absence of a panel structure, the only possibility is to confine time-invariant workers
fixed effects in the error term. Nevertheless, we believe that the highly detailed set
of observable characteristics that we include may reduce the loss of information.
The coefficient  a,t in Equation (1) is our parameter of interest as it indicates the
wage premium associated to the metropolitan area a at time t net of local industrial
mix and local workforce characteristics. Which factors determine such measure of
local productivity is the central question of our work; therefore, the identification of
the coefficient  a,t deserves special attention. In this context, Combes et al. (2011)
discuss the main sources of bias in the identification of agglomeration effects. One
of the main empirical issue derives from the fact that the quality of labour is endoge-
nous to the productivity of the metropolitan area: some cities more than others are
known to attract younger and highly educated workers or just more talented individ-
uals, who expect to gain more by moving to more productive cities. In particular, the
composition of the workforce is strictly connected to the size of the city. The com-
plementarity between cities and skills has been documented by a number of studies
3 The IPUMS sample that we use does not allow us to adopt a panel specification because indi-
vidual identifiers have not been provided due to confidentiality restrictions.
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(see, for example, Glaeser and Resseger, 2010) and may occur for two reasons. On
the one hand, the initial distribution of workers’ skills may vary according to the size
of the city with larger urban agglomeration having, on average, higher skill level. In
fact, better schools and universities in denser cities may increase the productivity of
natives; moreover, learning at the workplace may be faster in denser cities (Glaeser
et al., 2001; De la Roca and Puga, 2012). On the other hand, workers may sort by
skills and more talented individuals tend to co-locate in larger cities (Bacolod et al.,
2009): for instance, workers with a better learning potential may choose to go to
denser cities where more learning takes place. In econometric terms, the problem
translates into a positive covariance between the coefficient representing the local
wage premium and the observable and unobservable characteristics of the workforce.
Ideally, the problem of endogenous labour quality could be solved by adopting a
two-stages procedure and relying on a panel data structure in the first stage where it
would be possible to control for both observable (skills distribution among metropoli-
tan areas) and unobservable workers’ characteristics (non random sorting of skills)
(see, for example, Combes et al., 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). In particular,
it would be possible to estimate wage premia by means of a metropolitan dummy
variable having some workers that remain in each of the metropolitan areas be-
tween any two consecutive periods of time and a flow of workers from each of the
metropolitan areas. Differences between areas over time are identified by workers
that move across areas; workers that remain in the same metropolitan area provide
the identification for changes over time for their area. Hence, in a panel specifica-
tion, area fixed effect may be estimated separately from individual effect through
movers’ choice of location.
Here, we adopt a different identification strategy in order to overcome the limi-
tations due to the structure of our dataset, which is a simple cross-section repeated
over three decades. The general framework follows Combes et al. (2008) and we
maintain the two-stages procedure where the first stage is implemented on individ-
ual data while metropolitan statistical areas become the unit of observation of the
second stage. The aim of the first stage is that of estimating a measure of metropoli-
tan wage premium, that is the part of nominal wages that remains to be explained
after having considered the effect of the local industrial composition, the average
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workers characteristics and the non-random skill sorting across cities. The likely
sources of variation of wage premia are then tested in the second stage of the em-
pirical model and include the size of the local autonomous economic system, the
spatial spillovers among cities, the structure of the metropolitan governance as well
as the effectiveness of the policy solutions implemented in response to the problem
of poor governance.
Our main concern in the first stage is to distinguish the contribution of the “place”
from that of the “people” in the formation of individual wages. We believe that the
identification can be achieved by introducing an instrument for the metropolitan
area dummy variable. In particular, the current metropolitan area of residence is in-
strumented with the corresponding five-years lagged. In this way, the metropolitan
area of previous residence is used as an instrument for the current one. For the whole
dataset, about 77% of respondents have not moved from one metropolitan area to
another in the 5 years interval. The high correlation assures us that the relevance
condition for the validity of the instrument is satisfied, and we can move to the dis-
cussion about the exogeneity condition. In particular, we want the instrument to be
uncorrelated with the error term; in our specific case, with the unobserved workers
characteristics contained in the error term. Our identification strategy relies on the
non-random sorting of skills: if the individuals that moved in the previous period
are the more talented looking for better opportunities in more productive cities, then
using the previous metropolitan area of residence rather than the current one avoids
the over-estimation of the “place” contribution. Let’s consider, for example, an in-
dividual that earns a nominal wage higher than a colleague working in the same
industry but in a different place. The wage premium may be due to the fact that in
his metropolitan area agglomeration benefits foster local productivity and nominal
wages or that the individual is simply more talented than the colleague. If we try to
identify the contribution of the location characteristics by imputing the current MSA
of residence, we over-estimate it. Instead, if we use the previous residence (and it
is different from the current one), he will be excluded from the estimation of the
“place” effect of the currentMSA of residence. The area fixed effect is correctly iden-
tified if he is a high-skilled individual who has moved to a city that is more productive
than the previous one. This is the pattern described by Glaeser and Resseger (2010)
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and Bacolod et al. (2009). On the contrary, if skills sorting is random, the problem of
endogenous quality of labour ceases to exists and the use of the instrument cannot
be harmful for the estimation purposes because it captures a random process.
To sum up, the first-stage equation that we estimate is:
log wi,at =  Xi,at +  atdi,at 5 +µt ii,t + "i,at (2)
where wi,at is the nominal wage of individual i at time t who works in Metropolitan
Area a at time t, X is a vector of individual characteristics, di,at 5 is a vector of dummy
variables that take value 1 if the individual used to live in Metropolitan Area a five
years before and ii,t is the vector of industry dummies. The estimated coefficients
 at represent that part of wages variability that is not explained by workforce or
industrial composition 4. Details on the Census data used and on the construction
of the set of variables are available in the Appendix.
Subsequently, the second stage of the estimation procedure entails the use of
location fixed-effect as dependent variable, which is regressed on the set of explana-
tory variables of interest:
 ˆa,t = ✓ Tt + Za,t + ua,t (3)
where  ˆa,t are the estimated coefficients of themetropolitan areas a dummy variables
obtained from the first stage regression, Tt are additional year fixed effects, Za,t is a
matrix containing the explanatory variables and ua,t is the error term. The objective
of the second stage is the assessment of the relative importance of the size of the local
economy, the structure of urban governance and the spatial extent of agglomeration
effects in explaining the area-year fixed effects estimated in the first stage.
The size of the economy may be measured in terms of employment, population
or production. Ciccone and Hall (1996) suggested to use the number of individuals
per unit of land and Briant et al. (2010) argued that the adoption of density mea-
sures, instead of population level, should reduce the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
4 In order to catch the location specific effect, we hypothesize that the respondents used to live
and work in the same place. While the assumption would be barely defensible in many other contexts,
it turns out to be quite reasonable when the unit of analysis is the metropolitan area that represents
a local economic system as self contained as possible in terms of commuting patterns.
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even though shape distortions remain a second order concern with respect to correct
model specification. In general, both density and the size of the location should have
a positive impact on local productivity if agglomeration gains outweigh agglomera-
tion costs; therefore, it would be worthwhile to consider both effects in a logarithmic
specification (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). In particular, by introducing density and
land area among the explicative variables of Equation (3), it is possible to derive
conclusions about the gains from increasing the number of people while maintain-
ing land fixed (or viceversa) and the effect of land area for a given population level
which is equal to the difference between the effect of land area (with constant pop-
ulation) and the effect of density (with constant land). It should be noted that the
conclusion about the presence of agglomeration benefits are not invalidated even
though the last effect turns out to be negative. As a matter of fact, when using den-
sity and land area, agglomeration gains exist when any of the estimated coefficients
is significantly positive.
The second set of explanatory variables aim at assessing whether productivity
benefits associated to agglomeration economies may be enhanced by the presence
of a small number of local governments within the same metropolitan statistical
area or by the presence of a dominant municipality. In particular, the two dimen-
sions of the structure of urban governance that will be taken into account are the
level of fragmentation and the degree of dominance. The former is computed as the
number of municipalities in metropolitan areas in 1980, 1990 and 2000 as defined
by the Office of Management and Budget. The latter is the ratio of the population
living in the largest city of each metropolitan area to that of the metropolitan area
in contemporaneous configurations for the three decades. Note that the degree of
dominance needs to control for territorial extension of the central city in order to
take into account, for example, the case in which the central city is consolidated
with the county5. On the other hand, the level of fragmentation does not need to
control for the Metropolitan Area size6, since this dimension has already been taken
5 The consolidated city-county included in the analysis are Augusta-Richmond County, GA;
Indianapolis-Marion County, IN; Jacksonville-Duval County, FL; Louisville-Jefferson County, KY;
Nashville-Davidson County, TN; Macon-Bibb County, GA.
6 Usually the literature adopts the number of municipalities per 100,000 inhabitants (Stansel,
2005).
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into account by including density and land area. A final set of explanatory variables
include the policy responses to the issue of fragmented metropolitan governance. In
particular, we consider: presence of Council of Governments (COGs) and Metropoli-
tan Planning Organizations (MPOs), variety of services provided by the governance
bodies (Transport, Environment, Community Development, Public Safety, Economic
Development andWorkforce Development), Geographic Adherence of Regional Coun-
cils to metropolitan areas, number of special purpose governments and existence of
a metropolitan general purpose government. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the
complete list of explanatory variables with a synthetic description and the sources of
the data. An exhaustive explanation of the way in which the measure of Geographic
Adherence has been computed is in the Appendix as well.
Substantive spatial dependence A simple way to assess the spatial extent of ag-
glomeration effect is that of relying on the concept of market potential, which is a
proxy of the goodness in the access to the market. Once the specified equation to
be estimated contains on the RHS both density and market potential as measured in
terms of density, it resembles the generic formulation of a ‘’Spatial Lag of X” (SLX)
model (LeSage and Page, 2009), in which the independent variable is included with
a spatial lag. As argued by Gibbons and Overman (2012), the use of a SLX spec-
ification helps to overcome the identification problems that are typical in spatial
econometrics, i.e. a) the impossibility to distinguish different econometric specifica-
tions without assuming hypothetical prior knowledge of the data generating process
and b) the ‘’reflection problem” according to which it is not possible to recover the
unknown parameters of a model from their reduced form specification if it includes
both exogenous and endogenous characteristics of the neighbours.
There exists a number of variants for computing market potential; in fact, it is
possible to consider either population, employment or production in levels or density
forms. As shown by Combes and Lafourcade (2005), all the different formulations
measuring market potential are highly correlated but if density is used to measure
the size of the local economy, computing market potential using densities is more
consistent. In what follows, the market access variable used is the (log) of market
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potential computed from the density of neighbouring areas:
MPa,t =
nX
a 6=l=1
wa,l denl,t (4)
where wa,l are the elements of a spatial weighting matrix,W , providing a description
of the interactions between spatial units.
In order to deal with the uncertain functional form of spatial agglomeration ef-
fects, we introduce a parameterized distance based weights matrix where the dis-
tance decay parameter is estimated by using a nonlinear estimation technique, as
suggested by Vega and Elhorst (2015) and recently applied to the local multipliers
analysis by Gerolimetto and Magrini (2015). By adopting this approach, it is possi-
ble to capture more information on the way in which inter-dependencies between
spatial units are structured. Hence, the analysis consider the possibility that the rate
of decline of agglomeration benefits is sharper than the one determined simply by
the inverse of the distance. In particular, we employ a simple inverse distance matrix
with a threshold:
wa,l =
8<:1/d↵al , if 0 dal  d0, if dal > d (5)
where ↵ is the distance decay parameter, d is a distance threshold and dal represents
the distances between location a and l. Vega and Elhorst (2015) provide the details
about the nonlinear estimation technique of the distance decay parameter. Row-
normalization of W based on inverse distance make the economic interpretation of
the weights to be no longer valid in terms of distance decay. Hence, we apply a
min-max normalized matrix Kelejian and Prucha (2010) obtained by dividing each
element wal by
⌧= min
®
maxa
nX
l=1
wal , maxl
nX
a=1
wal
´
(6)
Endogenous quantity of labour A further empirical concern that arises involves
the possibility that some local characteristics are endogenous to local wages: a
metropolitan area that experiences a positive shock may increase its size because
21
of migrations. In this case, there may be a reverse causality problem that is going
to bias the estimates. In order to deal with the endogeneity issue, we adopt an in-
strumental variable approach and we assume that endogeneity may be caused by
contemporaneous local shocks, as in Ciccone and Hall (1996). So far, the literature
have adopted a number of instruments for solving the problem of endogenous quan-
tity of labour. For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) use long lags of population,
Combes et al. (2010) opt for the geological characteristics of regions and Combes
et al. (2008) choose some measures of geographical periphery.
The strategy that we adopt here involves the use of a Bartik instrument (Bartik,
1991) for density. For each metropolitan area, we calculate the number of workers in
each sector with respect to total employment in 19707. Each metropolitan area has
an imputed rate of growthwhich is the sectoral nationwide rate of growth that would
have been if its contribution was set to zero. The sum of the imputed rate of growth
weighted by the initial shares of employment constitutes the metropolitan counter-
factual rate of growth. The counter-factual level of employment is then determined
by applying the counter-factual rate of growth to the actual level of local employment
at the beginning of the period and it is used as instrument for density. The use of
the Bartik instrument helps to get rid of city-specific shocks and to isolate exogenous
shifts in the demand for labour. The counter-factual rate of growth of employment
in Metropolitan Area a ( Ba,t k to t) is computed as:
 Ba,t k to t =
24X
I2Ind
empl Ia,t kP
I2Ind empl Ia,t k
⇤  ln
 X
l2Reg 6=a
empl Il,t k to t
!35 (7)
where empl Ia,t k is employment in industry I , region a, time t and  t k to t indicates
the differences between years t   k to t. The first term on the RHS represents the
share of employment in region a that is employed in industry I , while the second
term is the change in employment, in industry I , for all other regions. From the
above computation derives the counter-factual level of employment which we use as
7 The industries that have been considered using the SIC classification are: Construction, Manu-
facturing, Transport and Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance Insurance and Real
Estate, Services; the source of the data for local industrial employment is the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, which provides information at the metropolitan level.
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instrument for the level of population density.
The floating area approach The geographic definition of the area that corre-
sponds to a local and autonomous economic system is not constant over time, as
the pattern of centralization and decentralization evolves, so the metropolitan area
changes its boundaries and internal composition. Hence, metropolitan areas are
different both in static as well as dynamic terms. The former source of variation
deals both with the number of administratively defined jurisdictions that shape the
statistical unit of analysis as well as with the concentration of population in the cen-
tral municipality; the latter derives from the evolution of the original configuration
over time. Usually, the literature considers the metropolitan areas’ delineation that
is in effect at a precise moment in time, but does not consider the evolution of MAs
boundaries even though the time frame of the analysis covers various modifications
in the delineations. Hence, in the case of a city that has expanded over time, either
the definition is the initial one and the level of fragmentation is underestimated, or
the definition is the latter one, and it is overestimated. Let’s think, for example, to
the spatial variation of Atlanta, GA. In 1960, the city consisted of five counties, by
1990 it had expanded to encompass twenty counties. Figure A1 in the Appendix
shows the spatial evolution of the metropolitan area of Atlanta, GA, as defined by
the Office of Management and Budget for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. If we
adopt the initial definition, Atlanta will show a low number of local governments for
the whole time series; on the other way round, by accepting the final delineation
and fitting it backwards, Atlanta will be characterized by a high level of horizontal
dispersion of power among individual lower-level governments.
Few authors have tackled the change in the boundaries issue (see, for exam-
ple, Gottlieb, 2006; Nucci and Long, 1995). Recently, Ferranna et al. (2016) analyse
how the spatial evolution of core-based city regions affects the dynamics of the cross-
sectional distribution of US MSAs per capita average incomes. The authors compare
the convergence results deriving from the application of different approaches to de-
fine MSAs over time: the fixed area and the floating area. The former uses the same
designation of counties over a series of decades, which may be beginning, ending or
some intervening date; the latter uses the universe of metropolitan counties at the
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beginning of each decade. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the mean values for den-
sity, land, fragmentation and dominance based on the floating area and on the fixed
area approaches. Fragmentation is here defined as the number of administrative
units (counties) that compose the metropolitan area per 100,000 inhabitants; dom-
inance is the percentage of population living in the central city. By reading across
rows, one can compare the average values over the three decades (1970, 1980,
1990) using the same universe of counties (i.e. fixed area approach). By reading
down the principal diagonal of each panel, one can compare average values using
the floating area approach. Percentage change with respect to the latter method are
reported in the last three columns. Data in Table A1 indicate that average values
for land and fragmentation (density and dominance) are, in general, lower (higher)
if we use the fixed area approach based on earlier years. In order to obtain more
reliable estimates, we suggest to evaluate the impact of the local government struc-
ture by adopting the floating area approach. In particular, following Ferranna et al.
(2016), the evaluation is conducted in accordance with the time-frames defined by
the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) official updates of the boundaries
delineations 8.
8 The adopted methodology is consistent with the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series’s defini-
tion of the geographical unit of analysis (Ruggles et al., 2015). In IPUMS samples, the variable that
identify the Metropolitan Area in which the respondent works generally correspond to contemporary
OMB delineations.
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4 Empirical Analysis
The importance of metropolitan governance structure in determining wage pre-
mia has been tested for a sample of 182 metropolitan areas in the US, over a time
period ranging from 1980 to 2000. A map of the metropolitan areas included in
the analysis is reported in Figure A2 in the Appendix. The main source of the data
for the first-stage of the regression is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2015) and the samples used are 1% samples for the years
1980, 1990 and 2000. The second stage of the regression uses data from the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis at the county level, then aggregated at the metropolitan
level according to the official delineations provided by the Office of Management
and Budget for the three decades. Table A2 in the Appendix provides a list of all the
variables included in the Second Stage of the estimation procedure, as well as a brief
description and the specific sources of the data. Corresponding descriptive statistics
are reported in the subsequent Table A4. Finally, a list of metropolitan governance
bodies is available in Table A5.
First Stage Estimation Results The following Table 1 presents the results in a
compact form for the set of workers observable characteristics, industry dummies as
well as Metropolitan Area fixed effects interacted with time dummies9.
In order to evaluate the relative importance of area fixed-effect with respect to
either worker characteristics, industry or time fixed effect, Table 2 summarizes the
explanatory power of the variables on the RHS of Equation 2 as in Abowd et al.
(1999). In particular, the table reports the standard deviation of the effect of the
(group of) explanatory variables and their correlation with (natural logarithm of)
wages, industry fixed effects and de-trended area fixed effects. The effect of each
variable has been constructed by multiplying its coefficient by its value for each ob-
servation; for a group of variables the sum of the effects is computed. The total
number of observations is 540,740 and all correlation between coefficients that are
not orthogonal by definition are significant at 1% level. Subsequently, we derive the
variability of the effect of each variable across workers. The table should be inter-
9Table A6 in the Appendix reports the results in more details
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Table 1: First Stage Specifications Results
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Age 0.0614⇤⇤⇤ 0.0564⇤⇤⇤ 0.0561⇤⇤⇤ 0.0536⇤⇤⇤
(85.47) (84.27) (84.08) (81.57)
Experience -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0005⇤⇤⇤
(-74.63) (-69.71) (-69.48) (-67.22)
Ethnicity 0.232⇤⇤⇤ 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.158⇤⇤⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤
(119.78) (88.46) (87.47) (87.66)
Gender 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.246⇤⇤⇤ 0.239⇤⇤⇤ 0.221⇤⇤⇤
(160.16) (176.81) (170.43) (148.82)
Very High Education 0.672⇤⇤⇤ 0.674⇤⇤⇤ 0.664⇤⇤⇤
(242.70) (238.20) (231.14)
High Education 0.382⇤⇤⇤ 0.386⇤⇤⇤ 0.373⇤⇤⇤
(140.65) (141.05) (136.97)
Medium Education 0.227⇤⇤⇤ 0.232⇤⇤⇤ 0.220⇤⇤⇤
(85.10) (86.76) (83.22)
N 540740 540740 540740 540740
R2 0.9626 0.9682 0.9684 0.9693
MSA X Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies No No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No No Yes
MSA clustered t statistics in parentheses; ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Reference categories for OCCUPATION: Occupa-
tion=Service Occupations; for EDUCATION: Education=Low; for GENDER: Gender=Female; for ETHNICITY: Ethnicity=Not
White; for INDUSTRY: Industry=Personal Services.
preted as follows: when the effect of a variable has a large standard deviation and it
is highly correlated with wages, then the variable of interest has a large explanatory
power. On the opposite, the variations of wages could be explained only marginally
if the effect of a variable has a small standard deviation and a small correlation with
wages.
Table 2 indicates the effect of :
• workers’ observable characteristics, which has the largest explanatory power.
The standard deviation (0.296) is quite large with respect to (log of) wages’
variability (0.590). Moreover, the correlation between workers’ characteristics
and wages is large (0.511). All of the others variables, or group of, show lower
standard deviations and correlation with wages than the set of workers’ char-
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition
Effect of Std.Dev. Simple correlation with:
ln w µ    ✓
log of wages (ln w) 0.590 1.000 0.181 0.139
worker’s characteristics ( X ) 0.296 0.511 0.049 0.012
industry fixed effects (µ) 0.098 0.181 1.000 0.023
area fixed effects (   ✓) 0.153 0.139 0.023 1.000
Notes: Area fixed effects are de-trended using the time fixed effects ✓ estimated in the second stage.
acteristics. This set includes: age and its square, gender, ethnicity, education
and occupation.
• industry fixed effects, which has a quite small explanatory power. In particular,
even though the correlation with wages (0.181) is quite high, the standard
deviation (0.098) is less than one sixth of that of worker characteristics.
• area fixed effects, which has a substantial power in explaining wages’ variabil-
ity, still lower than that of worker fixed effects. In fact, the correlation with
(ln of) wages is 0.139 while the standard deviation is 0.153, one fourth that
of wages. In order to distinguish its explanatory power from that of time fixed
effect, area fixed effects have been de-trended using the time fixed effects (✓)
estimated in the second stage.
In sum, the results of the First Stage estimation are in line with previous studies.
For example, Combes et al. (2008) estimate a model of wage determination across
local labour markets using a very large panel of French workers and find that the
set of variables with the strongest power in explaining wages’ variability is worker
fixed effects, followed by area-year fixed effects. Differently from the present anal-
ysis, they include also within-industry interactions (number of establishments and
industry share in employment) among the explanatory variables, but these turn out
to be of modest interest in explaining wages’ differences across locations.
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Second Stage Estimation Results The coefficients for the area fixed effects esti-
mated in the First Stage are then used as dependent variable in the Second Stage of
the regression (Equation 3) which is estimated by using a SLX-IV method. Table 3
reports the main results. The model has been estimated by using several specifica-
tions in order to: firstly, assess the negative impact of poor metropolitan governance,
i.e. highly fragmented metropolitan areas without a dominant jurisdiction; secondly,
evaluate the various policy responses to the coordination difficulties and, finally, to
test the hypothesis about the benefit deriving from having a general-purpose regional
structure with extensive powers.
In all the specifications, the explanatory variables introduced are density, land
area, market potential and the dimensions of urban governance structure, i.e. the de-
gree of dominance and the level of fragmentation. The coefficient of density is around
8% , is quite large with respect to the literature: Melo et al. (2009) show that there
is a great deal of variability in the magnitude of the estimates, although they are
usually found to be positive. The coefficient on land area is smaller than that on
density: an increase in population through higher density has a much larger effect
on wages than the one that we would have obtained if the same increase in popula-
tion had left density constant by increasing land area. The estimated coefficients of
the variables that proxy the structure of urban governance are both significant and
indicate how agglomeration benefits are penalized in the case of less consolidated
metropolitan areas. As a matter of fact, a metropolitan area with ten percentage
more administrative units than another of the same size, experiences wages that are
between 2.0% and 3.0% lower. Moreover, a ten percentage point decrease in the
share of population living in the central city is estimated to reduce productivity by a
small on average but highly significant amount, that is between 0.7% and 0.8%. The
distance decay parameter is non-linearly estimated according to the procedure devel-
oped by Vega and Elhorst (2015). Its estimation provides information on the way
spatial interactions fade as the distance between units increases which would not
been otherwise obtained by imposing it beforehand. The estimated distance decay
parameter ranges between 1.7 and 2.0, meaning that the rate of decline of agglom-
eration benefits is sharper than the one determined by the inverse of the distance.
The coefficient for market potential is positive and highly significant as it ranges be-
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tween 2.0% and 2.2%. The finding is in line with the literature; for example, Briant
et al. (2010) and Combes et al. (2008) have similar figures in their studies.
All the specifications introduce the instrument for density, in order to control for
the likely endogeneity deriving from reverse causality with wages. The instrument
is the counter-factual level of employment that would have been achieved if the local
economy was growing according to the counter-factual growth rate computed as the
weighted average of the imputed growth rate (nationwide sectoral growth rate net
of the individual contribution), where the weights are the initial shares of local in-
dustry employment. The instrument has a strong power in predicting density and
the R-squared of the first stage estimation of the two-stages least squares is 0.91 and
performs successfully in both the under-identification and weak identification tests.
As a matter of fact, the relevance of the instrument cannot be rejected at the 1%,
5%, or 10% confidence level; therefore, the model is identified. Moreover, the in-
strument results to be not weak, with a Wald F-statistics over 300, far higher than the
10% critical value computed by Stock and Yogo (2005). The diagnostics reported in
Table 3 clearly confirm that the level of metropolitan density is indeed endogenous
at a confidence level of 1%. A second instrument is introduced, which is the spatial
lag of the counter-factual rate of growth. The p-value for the over-identification test
arrives at 0.66 indicating that both the instruments are valid (uncorrelated with the
error term).
In Table A7 in the Appendix we report the sensitivity of the results to variations in
the shape and size of the spatial units of analysis. The data used in the model which
estimation results are reported in the first (second) column consider the metropoli-
tan areas as they are defined in the initial (final) period, i.e. 1980 (2000). In both
cases the specification used is the IV-SLX. Comparing the figures with the findings re-
ported in Table 3, it turns out that estimates for metropolitan governance structure
are upward biased when adopting a constant definition of the metropolitan area.
Still, the findings are in line with the ones derived by applying the floating defini-
tion approach; therefore, results are robust to the modifiable areal unit problem.
Stated the negative impact of poor metropolitan governance, let’s turn to the pol-
icy responses that have been applied to some metropolitan areas. Firstly (I) a mea-
sure of state centralization is introduced, in order to capture a possible state compo-
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nent in the variability of urban governance structure (McDowell and Edner, 2002).
We consider the State Centralization Index (SCI), following Paytas (2001) and Grass-
mueck and Shields (2010). The SCI has been formulated by Stephens (1974) and
updated by Stephens and Wikstrom (1999). The index rises with the level of state
centralization, classified as the extent of services delivered, financial responsibility
for public services and personnel adjusted for state and local differences in labour
inputs versus inputs of cash and capital. The index turns out not to be significant
in explaining wage differentials among metropolitan areas. A state component is
already contained in the (II) specification, where we add two dummy variables in-
dicating, respectively, weather a Council of Government or a Metropolitan Planning
Organization act over a significant part of the metropolitan area. Both variables
are highly correlated with a state dummy and present a statistically negative coef-
ficient, pointing out how the costs related to the implementation of a governance
body based on voluntary agreements between local jurisdictions outweigh benefit.
The finding is in line with the literature pointing out the unbalanced representative-
ness of COGs and MPOs due to a voting system non proportional or not weighted
by population (Lewis and Sprague, 1997; Sanchez, 2006) and the bureaucracy they
add to that already existing. A detailed analysis of the services provided by Council
of Governments may be found in specification (III). In most of the cases, whatever
the services provided by the COGs, the results are not significant in statistical terms.
It may be that COGs are duplicating functions provided by local governments in the
metropolitan area or that they do not respond efficaciously to local preferences. The
only service that has a negative but significant impact on metropolitan productiv-
ity is public safety, that maybe introduce a cost to regional economies by crowding
out resources to favour security needs of citizens living in the middle-class outlying
jurisdictions, which have more voice than central cities in voting boards.
Specification (IV) tackles the issue of geographic representativeness of Regional
Councils. A dummy variable have been introduced in order to capture the geographic
adherence of COGs to correspondent metropolitan area. In order to construct the
variable, we compute threemeasures by intersecting population inmetropolitan area
and population in the governance body and dividing it by either population in MA
(1) or population in the COG (2), and by calculating the ratio between population in
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the governance body with respect to that in the metropolitan area (3). By combin-
ing these indexes, six scenarios may be detected: 1) the COG is entirely contained in
the territory of the metropolitan area; 2) the COG extends beyond the boundaries of
the metropolitan area; 3) the COG is larger than the metropolitan area but doesn’t
contain it entirely; 4) the COG is smaller than the metropolitan area but it extends
outside its boundaries; 5) the COG and the MA perfectly coincide; 6) there’s no COG
in the MA. The variable introduced in the analysis (Geographic Adherence) tests the
hypothesis that perfect coincidence or slight mismatch between the two entities with
one containing entirely the other , are the preferred solutions. The coefficient esti-
mated for the dummy variable is in fact positive and statistically significant, which
supports the correctness of our statement. The contribute of COGs and MPOs in al-
leviating coordination difficulties when metropolitan areas are highly fragmented is
evaluated in (V) where the impact of interaction variables between both COGs and
MPOs with fragmentation are assessed. The former is only marginally significant
while the latter is not significant at all, meaning that the penalty due to a marginal
increase in the number of local governments is not going to be reduced in the case
in which a governance body is present in the metropolitan area.
Alternatively or side by side to COGs and MPOs, special districts may be created
to address local needs of population living in outlying counties. We added the num-
ber of special purpose governments to the (VI) specification observing that they do
not significantly affect average wages in metropolitan region. As stated by Duckett
(2012) and Orfield and Gumus-Dawes (2009) special districts tend to complicate the
problem by adding to local governments. Finally, we test hypothesis about the effec-
tiveness of general purpose regional governments with extensive powers, as those
in Twin Cities, MN and Portland, OR. Hence, a dummy variable that takes values
one in these two cases is introduced in specification (VII), where it turns out to be
positively and marginally significant. Actually, Minneapolis - St. Paul, MN is the only
metropolitan area to have implemented a metropolitan tax-base sharing according
to which revenues from property taxes are redistributed favouring low than average
per capita income municipalities (Orfield, 2002). This strategy seems to be the only
one (VIII) to give positive results. As a matter of fact, consolidated government like
that of Twin Cities is expected to increase local productivity by about 6%.
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Table 3: IV-SLX Estimation Results
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Density 0.0836⇤⇤⇤ 0.0834⇤⇤⇤ 0.0816⇤⇤⇤ 0.0835⇤⇤⇤ 0.0827⇤⇤⇤ 0.0811⇤⇤⇤ 0.0823⇤⇤⇤ 0.0823⇤⇤⇤
(12.40) (12.62) (12.96) (12.91) (12.93) (13.03) (13.01) (12.62)
Land 0.0834⇤⇤⇤ 0.0760⇤⇤⇤ 0.0766⇤⇤⇤ 0.0766⇤⇤⇤ 0.0748⇤⇤⇤ 0.0714⇤⇤⇤ 0.0753⇤⇤⇤ 0.0750⇤⇤⇤
(12.15) (10.99) (11.49) (10.94) (10.63) (9.83) (11.43) (10.82)
City Land -0.0272⇤⇤⇤ -0.0241⇤⇤⇤ -0.0222⇤⇤⇤ -0.0256⇤⇤⇤ -0.0252⇤⇤⇤ -0.0242⇤⇤⇤ -0.0257⇤⇤⇤ -0.0250⇤⇤⇤
(-4.83) (-4.34) (-4.28) (-4.66) (-4.89) (-4.68) (-4.81) (-4.80)
Market Potential 0.0222⇤⇤⇤ 0.0201⇤⇤⇤ 0.0201⇤⇤⇤ 0.0211⇤⇤⇤ 0.0207⇤⇤⇤ 0.0210⇤⇤⇤ 0.0216⇤⇤⇤ 0.0219⇤⇤⇤
(6.60) (6.11) (6.06) (6.14) (5.94) (6.11) (5.97) (6.24)
Fragmentation -0.0214⇤⇤⇤ -0.0199⇤⇤⇤ -0.0237⇤⇤⇤ -0.0203⇤⇤⇤ -0.0340⇤⇤⇤ -0.0294⇤⇤⇤ -0.0297⇤⇤⇤ -0.0301⇤⇤⇤
(-4.36) (-4.30) (-5.46) (-4.37) (-4.65) (-5.19) (-5.11) (-4.97)
Dominance 0.0882⇤⇤⇤ 0.0734⇤⇤⇤ 0.0811⇤⇤⇤ 0.0712⇤⇤⇤ 0.0709⇤⇤⇤ 0.0665⇤⇤⇤ 0.0731⇤⇤⇤ 0.0721⇤⇤⇤
(3.54) (3.16) (3.56) (3.12) (3.12) (2.98) (3.33) (3.28)
Distance Decay 2.051⇤⇤⇤ 1.926⇤⇤⇤ 1.836⇤⇤⇤ 1.776⇤⇤⇤ 1.745⇤⇤⇤ 1.747⇤⇤⇤ 1.725⇤⇤⇤ 1.734⇤⇤⇤
(9.11) (6.11) (6.02) (5.64) (5.79) (5.39) (5.66) (5.79)
SCI 0.00802
(0.25)
MPOs -0.0186⇤⇤⇤ -0.0137⇤⇤ -0.0162⇤⇤⇤ -0.0415⇤⇤ -0.0136⇤⇤ -0.0153⇤⇤ -0.0151⇤⇤
(-3.26) (-2.43) (-2.90) (-2.01) (-2.33) (-2.62) (-2.72)
COGs -0.0269⇤⇤⇤ -0.0311⇤⇤⇤ -0.0805⇤⇤⇤ -0.0684⇤⇤⇤ -0.0775⇤⇤⇤ -0.0789⇤⇤⇤
(-4.86) (-5.39) (-3.71) (-3.27) (-3.66) (-3.69)
Transport -0.0121⇤
(-1.65)
Environment 0.0141⇤⇤
(1.95)
Community 0.006
(0.79)
Public Safety -0.0321⇤⇤⇤
(-4.08)
Economic Development -0.0251⇤
(-2.04)
WF Development 0.00476
(0.40)
Geographic Adherence 0.0237⇤⇤ 0.0228⇤⇤ 0.0244⇤⇤ 0.0238⇤⇤ 0.0237⇤⇤
(2.55) (2.39) (2.53) (2.57) (2.52)
COGsXFragmentation 0.0164⇤⇤ 0.0123⇤⇤ 0.0153⇤⇤ 0.0157⇤⇤
(2.48) (2.02) (2.62) (2.43)
MPOsXFragmentation 0.0096
(1.48)
Special Districts 0.0052
(1.68)
General Purpose 0.0353⇤
(1.86)
Twin Cities 0.0606⇤⇤⇤
(3.42)
N 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546
MSA 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Over Identification 3.76 0.95 0.20 0.47 0.71 0.29 0.52 0.53
(p)Over Identification 0.05 0.32 0.66 0.52 0.40 0.59 0.47 0.47
Weak Identification 330.25 361.32 320.86 353.58 353.81 291.92 345.85 345.71
Under identification 105.89 104.91 115.73 104.26 109.05 112.47 102.96 102.54
(p)Under identification 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Endogeneity 12.18 9.37 8.28 10.43 10.92 12.12 11.06 8.62
(p)Endogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Bootstrap Robust Standard Errors. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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5 Conclusions
The impact on local productivity of the way in which urban agglomerations are
governed has received little attention, with few exceptions (Ahrend et al., 2014a).
However, this paucity of empirical studies is in stark contrast with anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting formal structure of metropolitan governance as a channel of direct
intervention for spurring local productivity. For example, local governments frag-
mentation has been indicated as the major cause of St. Louis inability to solve col-
lective challenges resulting in social tensions in places like Ferguson. Back in 1876,
the city of St. Louis separated from St. Louis County in order not to provide any
more services to the outlying areas. Moreover, St. Louis County contains 90 mu-
nicipalities, which rely mainly on revenue generated from traffic tickets and related
fines. Since 1960s, population loss due to migrations from the Rust Belt to the Sun
Belt has been later followed by a white flight from the city to the outlying places,
leaving St. Louis suburbs with a black-majority and a white-power structure (Bad-
ger, 2015; Smith, 2014). And again, local economies and commuting patterns do
not stop at municipal borders. Nonetheless, there are numerous cities where cer-
tain transport modes end at administrative boundaries. This is the case of Atlanta
metropolitan area (150 cities spread across 29 counties), whose mass transit system
does not extend far enough into the suburbs where workers live, causing them to
waste a lot of time in commuting. The Texas Transportation Institute has estimated
traffic congestion to cost extra 51 hours of commuting time each year to each At-
lanta commuter and an overall sum of more than $3.1 billion a year in lost time,
fuel and environmental degradation (Chapman and Trubey, 2015). More generally,
the narratives show how the presence of many small jurisdictions may hinder the ef-
fectiveness of problem solving and adjustments to change at the metropolitan scale
(Storper, 2010).
The paper tries to shed some light on the role played by metropolitan gover-
nance structure by investigating the determinants of spatial wage disparities among
metropolitan areas in the US. Productivity differentials are estimated by means of a
two-steps procedure, which allows us to distinguish between people and place con-
tribution in explaining them. The part of wages variability that is not explained by
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observable workers characteristics or industry fixed effects represents productivity
premia, which are then studied in relation to four broad drivers. The first regards
the size of the local economy, and deals with population density and metropolitan
land area; the second relates to the spatial extent of agglomeration benefits and it
is summarized in the market potential notion, the third concerns the structure of
urban governance and the fourth investigates the policy responses to the problem of
fragmentation.
The results indicate that agglomeration externalities are penalized when the
metropolitan area is highly fragmented into many administratively defined juris-
diction or when the population is not concentrated in the central city. Moreover,
the presence of voluntary governance bodies has a negative impact on wage premia,
indicating that costs related to the implementation of a governance body based on
voluntary agreements between local jurisdictions outweighs benefit, even though
effectiveness depends also on the geographical adherence to the metropolitan area.
Portland, OR and Minneapolis - Saint Paul, MN are two exceptions to the predomi-
nant type of metropolitan governance in the US. In fact, the former has a governance
body that has the status of full local government and a leadership elected by pop-
ular vote. The latter, delivers a wide range of services and benefits from an excep-
tionally high annual budget of USD 300 per inhabitant - compared to the the USD
3-30 per inh. range usually adopted from the other governance bodies (Ahrend and
Schumann, 2014). According to our ressults, the metropolitan regional government
applied to the Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN region featuring a metropolitan tax-base
sharing, is expected to increase local productivity.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Spatial evolution of Atlanta, GA metropolitan statistical area
Figure A1 shows how the metropolitan area of Atlanta, GA
has evolved over time. The nucleus of five counties marked
with I refers to the 1960 definition, then in the 1970 the
metropolitan area gas gained 10 counties, in 1990 other
three and finally, in 2000 Atlanta metropolitan area arrived
at twenty counties.
Figure A2: Map of the MSAs included in the analysis
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Table A1: Metropolitan Areas Definition
Absolute Values Percentage Change
Density 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1980 310.5 339.6 380.9 0.00% 1.46% 8.72%
(477.9) (500.7) (546.6) (0.0%) (1.7%) (2.7%)
1990 305.5 334.7 375.1 -1.63% 0.00% 7.07%
(470.2) (492.5) (537.3) (-1.7%) (0.0%) (0.9%)
2000 285.9 312.6 350.4 -8.60% -7.06% 0.00%
(466.5) (488.3) (532.4) (-2.4%) (-0.9%) (0.0%)
Land 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1980 2471.6 2471.6 2471.6 0.00% -1.38% -16.91%
(2549.4) (2549.4) (2549.4) (0.0%) (0.2%) (-33.5%)
1990 2508.6 2506.2 2508.6 -1.48% 0.00% -15.67%
(2544.5) (2543.6) (2544.5) (-1.5%) (0.0%) (-33.6%)
2000 2974.5 2974.5 2974.5 16.91% 15.75% 0.00%
(3832.1) (3832.1) (3832.1) (33.47%) (33.63%) (0.0%)
Fragmentation 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1980 0.660 0.609 0.548 0.00% 0.88% -6.44%
(0.41) (0.40) (0.38) (0.0%) (8.7%) (-0.7%)
1990 0.654 0.603 0.543 -0.89% 0.00% -7.26%
(0.38) (0.37) (0.35) (-9.3%) (0.0%) (-8.7%)
2000 0.710 0.653 0.585 7.13% 7.59% 0.00%
(0.41) (0.40) (0.38) (0.9%) (8.8%) (0.0%)
Dominance 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1980 0.380 0.370 0.358 0.00% 0.59% 4.32%
(0.185) (0.187) (0.187) (0.0%) (-1.66%) (0.39%)
1990 0.378 0.367 0.356 -0.59% 0.00% 3.72%
(0.189) (0.191) (0.190) (1.87%) (0.0%) (2.08%)
2000 0.365 0.355 0.343 -4.06% -3.62% 0.00%
(0.185) (0.186) (0.186) (-0.20%) (-2.21%) (0.0%)
Mean of Density, Land Area, Fragmentation and Dominance according to the approach adopted. Standard deviations in
parenthesis. Rows reports the year of definition of the metropolitan area, according to the OMB official bulletins. Columns
are the years to which the observations refer. By reading on the rows, the values are those corresponding to the constant
area approach, while the values corresponding to the floating area approach (in italic) may be read on the principal diagonal.
Corresponding percentage change with respect to the latter approach on the last three columns.
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Table A2: Second Stage Variables Description
Variable Name Description Sources of the Data
Wage Premium MSA fixed-effect derived from the First Stage Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) and
authors’ elaborations
Density Population density of the MSAa inh/km2 (natural
logarithm)
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Land Land of the MSAa in km2 (natural logarithm) Census of Governments - Government Organization -
County Area Counts (1977, 1987, 1997)
City Land Land of the central city in km2 (natural logarithm) Census of Governments Gazzeettee 1980, 1990, 2000
Fragmentation Number of municipalitiesa (natural logarithm) Census of Governments - Government Organization -
County Area Counts (1977, 1987, 1997)
Dominance Share of population living in the central city in
percentage terms
National Historical Geographic Information System /
Bureau of Economic Analysis (1980, 1990, 2000)
Special Districts Number of special districtsa (natural logarithm) Census of Governments - Government Organization -
County Area Counts (1977, 1987, 1997)
MPOs Dummy=1 if a Metro Planning Organization covers a
significant part of the MSA
National Association of Regional Councils
COGs Dummy=1 if a Council of Government covers a
significant part of the MSA
National Association of Regional Councils
Geographic Adherence Dummy=1 if the Council of Government is
geographically adherent to the MSA
Office of Management and Budget and authors’
elaborations
Market Potential Sum of population density in neighbouringa MSA
discounted by distance
Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’
elaborations
State Centralization Index Index of state centralization based on the services
delivered by the state, the financial responsibility of
the state and state government personnel
Stephens (1997) as calculated for 1995
General Purposeb Dummy=1 if a Metro Planning Organization has
strong general purpose governance structures
National Association of Regional Councils
a Data at the county level, then aggregated at the metropolitan level according to the delineations provided by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB, 1980-1990-2000)
b There are only two MPOs, i.e. the Twin Cities’ Metropolitan Council and Portland’s Metro, that resemble a full-fledged regional system
necessary to integrate land use, transportation, housing and environmental policy on a metropolitan scale.
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Table A3: Descriptive Evidences
MSA Wage Premium Population Fragmentation Dominance Governance Body
Los Angeles, CA 0.58 9,538,191 88 0.39 Yes
New York, NY 0.96 9,326,888 52 0.86 Yes
San Francisco, CA 0.86 4,135,875 88 0.19 Yes
Atlanta, GA 0.64 4,049,569 105 0.10 Yes
St. Louis, MO 0.51 2,629,933 233 0.13 Yes
Seattle, WA 0.70 2,420,080 56 0.23 Yes
San Jose, CA 1.00 1,684,947 15 0.53 Yes
Sacramento, CA 0.58 1,638,114 13 0.25 No
Data refer to the year 2000. Wage Premia as estimated in the I Stage, normalized with respect to the mean. Fragmentation measures the number
of municipalities in the Metropolitan Statistical Area, Dominance indicates the share of people living in the central city with respect to the whole
metropolitan population.
Table A4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
Wage Premium 0.733 0.089 0.496 1.067 0.33 3.21
Density 4.479 0.813 2.41 7.842 0.25 4.20
Land 8.529 0.763 6.385 11.541 0.24 3.51
City Land 3.865 1.017 1.334 6.633 0.20 2.84
Fragmentation 3.146 0.893 1.317 5.75 0.33 2.91
Dominance 0.36 0.189 0.058 0.915 0.75 3.03
Special Districts 3.595 1.091 0 6.544 -0.14 3.37
SCI 3.989 0.098 3.793 4.264 -0.86 2.76
MPOs 0.516 0.500 0 1
COGs 0.582 0.494 0 1
Geographic Adherence 0.108 0.311 0 1
General Purpose 0.011 0.104 0 1
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Notes on the computation of the variable Geographic Adherence
Geographic Adherence is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the boundaries
of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) coincides or there is just a slight mismatch
with those of the Council of Government (COG). In order to assign a value for each of
the MSAs under analysis, we firstly compute twomeasures that relate the geographic
extensions of the two territorial entity and then we present the whole set of resulting
scenarios. Finally, we identify the scenario representing the situation in which the
geographic extension of the Metropolitan Statistical Area is barely the same as that
of the corresponding Council of Government.
We named Ratio the first measure of geographic adherence as it indicates the
ratio between the number of people under a COG jurisdiction with respect to the
population of the corresponding MSA, i.e.:
Ratio =
Populat ion COG
Population MSA
Thereafter, Coverage measures the share of population living in the MSA that is rep-
resented in the corresponding Council of Government, i.e.:
Coverage =
Populat ion MSA \ Populat ion COG
Population MSA
By combining the values obtained from the two measures, it is possible to identify
three general scenarios: a) the MSA is entirely contained in the COG; therefore,
Ratio > 1 and Coverage = 1; b) the COG is entirely contained in the MSA, i.e.
Ratio < 1 and Coverage < 1; c) the COG and the MSA overlaps but both of them
have only a fraction that intersects the other. In the latter case, Ratio may be what-
ever while Coverage < 1.
Hence, we hypothesis that the most effective scenario is the one characterised
by Coverage = 1 and 1.0  Ratio  1.2, meaning that all the people living in the
MSA are represented by the correspondent COG, which geographical extension is
identical to that of the MSA or just a little bit greater, in such a way to control for
further extension of the autonomous local economic system.
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Notes on the First Stage
Data:
The source of CENSUS data is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).
Samples used are 1% samples for the years 1980 1990 2000. The analysis has been
restricted to workers aged between 25 and 65 years old and excludes “self-employed”
workers (using the variable CLASSWRK).
Dependent variable:
Hourly wage = Labour income / (Weeks Worked * Hours usually worked per week)
Labour income is the variable INCWAGE, which reports each respondent’s total pre-
tax wage and salary income - that is, money received as an employee - for the pre-
vious year. Sources of income in INCWAGE include wages, salaries, commissions,
cash bonuses, tips, and other money income received from an employer. Payments-
in-kind or reimbursements for business expenses are not included. Amounts are ex-
pressed in contemporary dollars; therefore, they have been adjusted for inflation by
using CPI99 that provides the CPI-U multiplier available from the Bureau of labour
Statistics to convert dollar figures to constant 1999 dollars.
Weeks Worked is the variable WKSWORK1 for years 1980 and 1990 and variable
WKSWORK2 for years 2000. The variables report the number of weeks that the re-
spondent worked during the previous calendar year.
Hours usually worked per week is the variable UHRSWORK which reports the number
of hours per week that the respondent usually worked, if the person worked during
the previous year. Hourly wage statistics are constructed only for those workers
who usually work more than 30 hours per week and more than 30 weeks a year, and
whose hourly wage is higher than half of the minimum wage in the corresponding
year (1.55 in 1980, 1.90 in 1990, 2.575 in 2000).
Independent variables:
Age, which is the variable AGE that reports the person’s age in years as of the last
birthday.
Educational Dummies that are constructed by using variable EDUC, indicating re-
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spondent’s educational attainment, as measured by the highest year of school or
degree completed. Four categories are defined: a) Less than high school, b) High
school c) 1 to 3 years of college d) 4 years of college or higher.
Gender Dummy that is constructed by using the variable SEX: Gender = 0 if Female.
Ethnicity Dummy that uses RACE: Ethnicity = 0 if Not White.
Occupational Dummieswhich derive from the census variable OCC. The occupational
classification system gets redefined for every decennial Census, especially in 2000.
In order to track detailed occupations over time, I followed Autor and Dorn (2013)
who provide crosswalk necessary to match occupation codes for different Census
year. The authors develop a new occupation system covering the years 1980, 1990,
2000, 2005. Six categories are defined: 1) Managerial and Professional Specialty
Occupations, 2) Technical, Sales and Administrative Support Occupations, 3) Service
Occupations, 4) Precision Production, Craft and Repair Occupations, 5) Machine Op-
erators, Assemblers and Inspectors and 6) Transportation, Construction, Mechanics
(Mining and Agricultural Occupations).
Industrial Dummies which it are obtained from IND1990 which classifies industries
from all years since 1950 into the 1990 Census Bureau industrial classification scheme.
IND1990 offers researchers a consistent long-term classification of industries. Twelve
categories are defined: 1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 2) Mining, 3) Construc-
tion, 4) Manufacturing, 5) Transportation, Communications, and other Public Utili-
ties, 6) Wholesale Trade, 7) Retail Trade, 8) Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, 9)
Business and Repair Services, 10) Personal Services, 11) Entertainment and Recre-
ation Services and 12) Professional and Related Services.
Time Dummies: for the years 1980 1990 2000
Metro Area Dummies: MIGMET5 identifies the metropolitan area in which the re-
spondent used to work five years earlier, if the respondent’s workplace was in an
identifiable metropolitan area, given confidentiality restrictions (182 metro areas).
Estimation Results Table A6 presents the First Stage estimates for the set of workers
observable characteristics (age, ethnicity, gender, education, occupation), industry
fixed effect as well as Metropolitan Area fixed effects interacted with time dummies.
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Table A6: First Stage Specifications Results - Details
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Age 0.0614⇤⇤⇤ 0.0564⇤⇤⇤ 0.0561⇤⇤⇤ 0.0536⇤⇤⇤
(85.47) (84.27) (84.08) (81.57)
Experience -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0006⇤⇤⇤ -0.0005⇤⇤⇤
(-74.63) (-69.71) (-69.48) (-67.22)
Ethnicity 0.232⇤⇤⇤ 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.158⇤⇤⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤
(119.78) (88.46) (87.47) (87.66)
Gender 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.246⇤⇤⇤ 0.239⇤⇤⇤ 0.221⇤⇤⇤
(160.16) (176.81) (170.43) (148.82)
Very High Education 0.672⇤⇤⇤ 0.674⇤⇤⇤ 0.664⇤⇤⇤
(242.70) (238.20) (231.14)
High Education 0.382⇤⇤⇤ 0.386⇤⇤⇤ 0.373⇤⇤⇤
(140.65) (141.05) (136.97)
Medium Education 0.227⇤⇤⇤ 0.232⇤⇤⇤ 0.220⇤⇤⇤
(85.10) (86.76) (83.22)
Manager/Professional 0.0884⇤⇤⇤ 0.0993⇤⇤⇤
(32.85) (37.23)
Production 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.163⇤⇤⇤
(25.19) (20.33)
Transportation/Construction 0.173⇤⇤⇤ 0.148⇤⇤⇤
(32.17) (27.82)
Machine Operators 0.129⇤⇤⇤ 0.0631⇤⇤⇤
(19.72) (9.61)
Clerical -0.0153⇤⇤⇤ -0.00389
(-4.25) (-1.10)
Agriculture -0.249⇤⇤⇤
(-33.30)
Mining 0.244⇤⇤⇤
(23.16)
Construction 0.101⇤⇤⇤
(27.82)
Manufacturing 0.130⇤⇤⇤
(49.45)
Transportation 0.166⇤⇤⇤
(54.08)
Wholesale Trade 0.0804⇤⇤⇤
(21.19)
Retail Trade -0.120⇤⇤⇤
(-40.97)
Finance 0.130⇤⇤⇤
(39.48)
Business 0.0310⇤⇤⇤
(8.28)
Entertainment -0.0508⇤⇤⇤
(-7.18)
Professional 0.0132⇤⇤⇤
(5.16)
N 540740 540740 540740 540740
R2 0.9626 0.9682 0.9684 0.9693
MSA X Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA clustered t statistics in parentheses; ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01 Reference categories for OCCUPATION: Occupa-
tion=Service Occupations; for EDUCATION: Education=Low; for GENDER: Gender=Female; for ETHNICITY: Ethnicity=Not
White; for INDUSTRY: Industry=Personal Services.
Sensitivity of the results to different approaches to define Metropolitan Areas
Table A7: Sensitivity Results
(Initial) (Final)
Density 0.080*** 0.075***
(0.006) (0.006)
Land 0.084*** 0.085***
(0.007) (0.007)
City Land -0.023*** -0.021**
(0.006) (0.006)
Market Potential 0.034*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.004)
Fragmentation -0.026*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.004)
Dominance 0.122*** 0.126***
(0.026) (0.026)
Distance Decay 1.76*** 1.69***
(0.200) (0.182)
Observations 546 546
Year FE Yes Yes
Metropolitan Areas 182 182
Over Identification 0.599 0.360
(p)Over Identification 0.439 0.548
Weak Identification 514.51 401.73
Under Identification 118.72 103.58
(p)Under Identification 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 8.69 7.56
(p)Endogeneity 0.00 0.00
OLS estimates with Standard Errors clustered by metropolitan area in parenthesis.⇤⇢ < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤⇢ < 0.05,⇤ ⇤ ⇤⇢ < 0.01.
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